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Abstract:  
International entrepreneurship is generating an increasing stream of research. However, this is 
mainly concerned with the description of strategies used by born globals and with the comparison 
between their behaviour and that of traditional exporters. The study of the very early stages of the 
entrepreneurial process as well as the contrast with purely domestic ventures has been neglected. 
This exploratory paper, based on case studies of two pairs of high tech firms (ICT and 
biotechnology), focusses on the differences of opportunity framing processes between born 
globals and domestic ventures. Empirical evidence shows that born globals’ entrepreneurs frame 
their opportunities with no geographic boundaries, show higher-levels of self-perception, master 
deeper and more complex knowledge and are more involved in international networks than the 
founders of domestic ventures. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
International entrepreneurship (IE), as the interplay between entrepreneurship and 
internationalization (Zahra and George, 2002), is becoming one of the most attractive fields of 
research in the last few years (Dimitratos and Jones, 2005; Oviatt and McDougall, 2000).  
 
The emergence of a new breed of firms, addressed since inception to international markets, 
exploring global niches and extensively using cooperative entry modes challenged the traditional 
stages approach (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). Such firms – called born globals (Rennie, 1993) or 
international new ventures (McDougall, 1989; Oviatt and McDougall, 1994) - became the focus 
of a promising strand of research. Their behaviour incorporates characteristics associated to an 
international entrepreneurial orientation (Dimitratos and Plakoyiannaki, 2003), such as 
innovativeness, pro-activeness, risk taking, learning propensity and networking orientation.  
 
However, in spite of the contributions by Crick and Spence (2005) and Spence (2003), research 
has, to a large extent, been concentrated on the description and analysis of the content of new 
ventures internationalization strategies rather on the process of designing those strategies (Zahra 
et al, 2005). Research has been focussed on issues such as the speed of internationalisation, 
geographical diversification of activities, entry modes and the role of relationships and social 
capital (Dominguinhos and Simões, 2004; Rialp et al, 2005). In contrast, there has been a dearth 
of research on the differences between this new type of firms and ‘born domestic’ companies1. 
                                                            
1 We are aware of the literature comparing born globals and traditional exporters (Chetty and Campbell-Hunt, 2004; 
Karagozoglu, N., and Lindell; Keng and Jiun, 1989; Madsen et al, 2002; Moen, 2001; Preece et al, 1999). However, 
our concern here is about differences between born globals and domestic firms. We thank an anonymous referee for 
calling our attention to this question. 
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McDougall (1989) and McDougall et al (2003) have studied the differences between domestic 
and international new ventures, but concentrated mainly on strategic issues and industry 
structures.  
 
We argue, however, that this just corresponds to deal with the explicit consequences of 
differences, overlooking key issues leading to differences in the way how opportunities are 
framed. In other words, there is a need to look at how entrepreneurs conceptualise the 
competitive terrain, as Zahra et al (2005) have underlined. This requires a stronger focus on 
opportunity framing, understanding how international business opportunities emerge through 
processes of recognition, search or discovery (Dimitratos and Jones, 2005; Zahra and George, 
2002), as well as how entrepreneurs’ attitudes, competences and cognitive skills influence such 
processes. Further attention should therefore be paid to the early phase of the entrepreneurial 
processes – opportunity framing. 
 
The present paper is aimed at understanding how opportunities are framed in born global firms 
compared to domestic new ventures, on the basis of case studies contrasting pairs of firms in two 
industries (ICT and Biotech). Our main argument is that different internationalization strategies 
and patterns are rooted in the early phases of firm configuration, mainly in opportunity 
recognition and/or enactment, when firms’ may still be envisaged as an expression of 
entrepreneurs’ egos and mindsets (Zahra et al, 2005). It is suggested that, since the very 
beginning, opportunities leading to born globals are framed in an international arena while those 
leading to domestic new ventures are locally bounded.  
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The rest of the paper develops as follows. The next chapter provides a review the relevant 
literature on entrepreneurship processes, focussing on the individual/opportunity nexus, on 
opportunity framing, and on born globals. Such a review will allow us to identify a few research 
propositions. The third section deals with the method followed. Then, a brief presentation of two 
contrasting pairs of firms is undertaken. Subsequently, propositions are assessed and a discussion 
is provided. The paper closes with a section on conclusions and suggestions for further research.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
Entrepreneurial Processes 
Framing and exploitation of opportunities has been outlined as the distinctive domain of 
entrepreneurship (Kirzner, 1973, 1997; Shane and Venkarataman, 2000; Stevenson and Jarillo, 
1990; Venkarataman, 1997). They may be envisaged as the result of perceptions, conjecturing 
processes and actions undertaken by people (Caraça and Simões, 1995). Entrepreneurship is, 
therefore, understood as a process, which is translated into entrepreneurial projects aimed at the 
creation of new firms. 
 
A common thread in the literature is that opportunities correspond to something that has not been, 
so far, detected by others (Gaglio and Katz, 2001; Shane and Eckhardt, 2003; De Bono, 1978). 
Entrepreneurial ideas can arise from systematic search, either proactively or reactively, or emerge 
fortuitously (Ardichvilli and Cardozo, 2000; Chandler et al, 2002; Gaglio, 1997). Such ideas 
need to be further developed and assessed to become opportunities. Martello (1994) postulates 
that this development is based on intensive and rational working on the field, stressing the 
relevance of entrepreneurs’ interpretative schemes on the information provided by their action 
space. Other researchers have argued that opportunity recognition is a cognitive process where 
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alertness plays a decisive role (Kirzner, 1973). Opportunities may be envisaged as objective 
realities that pre-exist the entrepreneurial process (Kirzner, 1973, 1997; Shane, 2000, 2003). 
From this perspective, they are ‘there’, just waiting to be discovered.  
 
This approach has been strongly criticised. Gartner et al (2003) and Sarasvasthy (2001) consider 
that opportunities are enacted by the interaction between entrepreneurs and the environment. So, 
each opportunity is specific and builds on entrepreneurs’ knowledge, competences, attitudes and 
cognitive processes. Sarason et al (2005) argue that one can not separate opportunities from 
individuals: opportunities are seen as individual idiosyncratic conceptualizations of an 
instantiated social and economic system. Agents have to select ‘facts’ from the environment, in 
order to make judgments about them. But only the ‘facts’ known by each individual can be 
selected, which means that opportunities are based on specific knowledge possessed by people. 
Thus, the interplay between entrepreneur and the environment leads to the enactment of 
opportunities. In this view, opportunities emerge from individuals’ daily activities and from their 
capability to make sense of future actions (Gartner, 1993).  
 
Such a sense-making process (Weick, 1995) is influenced by contexts, competences, attitudes and 
cognitive mechanisms of individuals. Information is often sticky, which means that it is available 
only to those individuals who are involved in specific types of inter-action (Von Hippel, 1994), 
but only a few of them will translate it into entrepreneurial opportunities. Under these conditions, 
opportunities are not ‘just there’, waiting to be discovered. In fact, opportunities are generated in 
entrepreneurs’ minds through a process of conjecturing (Caraça and Simões, 1995), either self-
conjecturing or as a result of interactions with others. Based on their previous knowledge 
trajectories and on their present interactions, individuals develop an understanding of market 
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demands and technological applications which lead to the framing of entrepreneurial 
opportunities. Such a conjecturing process requires market validation. Therefore, relationships 
are activated, to assess the feasibility and desirability of those opportunities (Shapero, 1975; Van 
der Veen, 2004), as well as to mobilize the resources required for their implementation. 
 
Several theoretical models of opportunity recognition have been developed (Ardichvili et al, 
2003; Bhave, 1994; De Koning, 1999; Sigrist, 1999). They highlight three distinct features of 
entrepreneurs: attitudes and motivations; knowledge and experience; and social networks. 
 
Individuals’ personal traits and attitudes have long since been used to explain entrepreneurial 
behaviours: creativity (Schumpeter, 1934), need for achievement (McClleland, 1961), alertness 
(Kirzner, 1973; Ray and Cardoso, 1996), risk taking (Brockaus, 1980), internal locus of control 
(Schere, 1982), and imagination (Shackle, 1982). An association between creativity and 
opportunity recognition (Hills et al, 1997; Lumpkin et al, 2003; Schumpeter, 1934) has been 
identified. Alertness has been envisaged as driving individuals to interpret facts and informations 
in a way leading them to opportunity recognition (Ray and Cardoso, 1996). Similarly, a positive 
self perception is connected to the capability of identifying opportunities where others perceive 
risks, and to strongly commit to the successful accomplishment of planned tasks (Krueger and 
Brazeal, 1994; Krueger and Dickson, 1994). 
 
Shane (2000) found that entrepreneurs identify opportunities that are closely related to their 
knowledge base and prior experience. Puhakka (2002) stressed the role of formal knowledge 
(education and technical skills) on opportunity recognition. Additionally, Orwa (2003) concluded 
that alertness capability is related to entrepreneurs’ work experience and networks. Previous 
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knowledge and experience lead people to develop mental models that guide them in interpreting 
the reality. Information asymmetry implies that each individual develops a specific “knowledge 
corridor” (Hayek, 1945; Ronstadt, 1988), which may be used for opportunity identification. 
Three types of knowledge seem to be particularly relevant: prior knowledge of markets; prior 
knowledge of customer problems; and ways to serve markets (Orwa, 2003; Shane, 2000).  
 
The literature has also shown that entrepreneurs’ networks are very important for opportunity 
recognition (Hills et al, 1997, Orwa, 2003). Drawing on Granovetter’s (1973) work,  De Konning 
(1999) suggested that entrepreneurs’ networks encompass four levels: inner circle (long-term and 
stable relationships); action set (people recruited for opportunity development); partnerships 
(start-up team members); and weak ties (used to gather general information that could be used in 
testing an opportunity or in answering a general question). This is consistent with Singh’s (2000) 
finding that entrepreneurs use different types of contacts in the process of framing opportunities:  
weak ties for technological information, and familiar contacts for feedback. In the same line, 
Birley (1985) found that entrepreneurs tend to seek advice and suggestions for their core ideas 
and business plans from their families and from other formal ties. It was also found that the use 
of social networks increases the number of opportunities identified, and that these grow with the 
breadth of the social network (Singh et al, 2000). The exposure to different contexts and different 
realities allows entrepreneurs to gather additional information to be taken into account and 
interpreted according to their daily activities. Besides this role as a source of information and 
knowledge, social capital may also be used to reinforce the desirability and the feasibility of the 
opportunity, since ideas ant their commercial and industrial applications may be scrutinized by 
experts in their communities of practice. Membership of international networks provides the 
access to, and the development of, new knowledge, while enabling the test of envisaged 
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commercial applications (Dominguinhos and Simões, 2005). Such benefits are restricted to 
network members, incorporating some advantages of newness and innovation.  
 
International Entrepreneurship and Born Globals 
IE is obviously very closely linked to the literature on entrepreneurship in general, reviewed 
above. The definition of IE provided by Zahra and George (2002: 261) – “the process of 
creatively discovering and exploiting opportunities that lie outside a firm’s domestic markets in 
the pursuit of competitive advantage” – is strongly influenced by Shane and Venkataraman’s 
(2000) definition of entrepreneurship.  McDougall and Oviatt (2003: 7) considered IE as “the 
discovery, enactment, evaluation, and exploitation of opportunities – across national borders – to 
create future goods and services”. From our perspective, the key feature common to these 
definitions, besides the obvious reference to crossing national markets, is the emphasis on 
opportunities. It should be noted, however, that while Zahra and George (2002) appear to rely on 
the discovery approach, McDougall and Oviatt (2003) introduce a reference to the process of 
enacting opportunities, being thereby closer to the understanding of opportunity framing 
developed in the previous subsection. 
 
As mentioned above, research in IE is strongly focussed on the characterization of a new type of 
firms, usually labelled as international new ventures or born globals (Dimitratos and Jones, 2005; 
Zahra and George, 2002)2. Entrepreneurs’ networks and social capital, as well as learning have 
emerged as key elements in explaining the phenomenon. There has been, however, little research 
on the process of opportunity framing by born globals entrepreneurs.  
                                                            
2 In the present paper, we will use the two terms interchangeably, although we prefer the label born globals for being 
more sharp and concise. 
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Focussing now on the comparison between born globals and other types of firms, two main 
strands of research may be identified: (1) born globals versus ‘ordinary’ exporters (Aspelund and 
Moen, 2001; Chetty and Campbell-Hunt, 2004; Knight, 1997; Moen and Servais, 2002); and (2) 
born globals versus new domestic ventures (McDougall, 1989; McDougall et al, 2003).  
 
The first strand of research indicates that one of distinctive characteristics of born globals is their 
knowledge intensity (Luostarinen and Gabrielsson, 2002). These firms tend to be more common 
in industries where products have short life cycles, demanding continuous innovation and calling 
for specialised and difficult-to-imitate resources. They sell unique and specialised products or 
services (Oviatt and McDougall, 1995), often anchored in leading edge technologies. In this vein, 
they frequently follow international niche market strategies (Andersson and Wictor, 2003; 
Aspelund and Moen, 2001; Oviatt and McDougall, 1995). These involve product differentiation 
(Bloodgood et al, 1996; McAuley, 1999; Oviatt and McDougall, 1995) and a strong customer 
focus (Aspelund and Moen, 2001), thereby requiring a good understanding of their needs while 
using them as a source for continuous innovation. 
 
Born globals tend be launched by entrepreneurs with strong technical, scientific, managerial and 
marketing competences (Andersson and Wictor, 2003; Crick and Spence, 2005; Jones, 1999; 
Oviatt and McDougall, 1995). International operations are often supported by a complex network 
of partners along the value chain – or else, based on the vertical segmentation of businesses. In 
sectors demanding continuous innovation, a considerable investment in R&D is undertaken, often 
in the context of international cooperative projects. In fact, partnerships play an important role in 
enabling born globals to obtain complementary resources, to spread costs and to get access to 
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international markets (Autio et al, 2000; Coviello and Munro, 1995; Madsen and Servais, 1997; 
Zahra et al, 2000). Strong and weak ties are mobilized by entrepreneurs to design, manufacture 
and market distinctive products or services. Social capital is often assimilated to a resource, 
providing the young firm the credibility needed to get the ‘right’ to enter strategic international 
networks, making possible to overcome the liabilities of newness and smallness. 
 
The second stream of research is more limited, broadly corresponding to the research undertaken 
by McDougall (1989) and McDougall et al (2003), contrasting international and domestic new 
ventures. From this research, one may conclude that the main discriminatory factors concern the 
following: (i) international as well as industry experience of entrepreneurial teams; (ii) focus on 
globally integrated industries; and (iii) strategic variables, including strategy aggressiveness, 
product innovation, service and marketing intensity, use of a larger number of channels of 
distribution, and especially an emphasis on quality (McDougall et al, 2003). However, contrary 
to most research in the first stream, McDougall et al (2003) found a negative association between 
technical experience and international new ventures; as the authors recognise this may be due to 
the characteristics of the sample used. 
 
One may conclude, therefore, that extant literature on international versus domestic new ventures 
is scarce and focused on strategy and industry structure issues, with an inroad on the experience 
of the entrepreneurial team. It is mostly concerned with experience, positioning and behaviour of 
firms, and not so much with the early phases of entrepreneurial processes. In fact, the issue 
whether the framing of opportunities in international new ventures is different from the similar 
process in domestic ventures has received scant attention (George and Zahra, 2002). In spite of 
the existence of a few papers dealing with the international orientation of entrepreneurs as a 
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distinctive feature in born globals, there is a need to understand their mindsets, trajectories, 
experiences, and relationships (Zahra et al, 2005), and on how these influence the opportunity 
framing process.  
 
PROPOSITIONS 
 
The research by Chandler et al. (2002) suggests that the design of the organization, and of their 
products and services, as well as the selection of the markets to serve, are closely linked to the 
opportunity framing process. Kobrin (1994) proposes that managerial mindsets have a strong 
influence on the geographic scope of firms’ activities. Entrepreneurs’ international orientation 
has also been identified as a distinctive feature of born globals (Aspelund and Moen, 2001; 
Harveston et al, 2000; McDougall et al, 2003; Moen, 2002; Oviatt and McDougall, 1995).  
 
It has been argued that, in born globals, entrepreneurs provide the visionary thinking, define the 
business concept, possess the innate desire to implement it through the launching of a new 
company, and are able to mobilize a team of people (Oviatt and McDougall, 1995; Sharma and 
Blomstermo, 2003; Simões and Dominguinhos, 2001; Wakkee, 2004). Case studies suggest that 
born global entrepreneurs have, since the very beginning (i.e. opportunity framing), seen the 
world as the natural place for doing business, and have never considered another possibility 
(McDougall and Oviatt, 1995; Phiri et al, 2003; Sharma and Blomstermo, 2003) .  
 
We propose, therefore, that, 
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P1: Born globals are associated to opportunities framed without reference to geographic  
boundaries, while in  domestic ventures opportunities are designed, prima facie, taking into 
account a domestic market context 
 
It is widely acknowledged that international new ventures often follow innovative approaches, 
offering novel products or services, aimed at creating new niche markets. Those products or 
services may be the result of specific R&D activities conducted at Universities or public 
laboratories (Andersson and Wictor, 2003; Sharma and Blomstermo, 2003; Wakkee, 2004). They 
may also stem from a distinctive interpretation of emerging market features (Simões and 
Dominguinhos, 2001). 
 
Born globals usually compete in industries where short life cycles compel them to go abroad to 
rapidly exploit opportunity windows (Knight, 1997; Oviatt and McDougall, 1995). Often, such 
firms do not possess neither the knowledge about external markets nor sufficient financial and 
other types of resources required to compete in the global arena. Besides this liability of 
smallness, there is no track record on international market to convince potential customers. Under 
these conditions, it becomes very difficult to assess the feasibility and desirability of 
entrepreneurial ideas in international contexts. This means that entrepreneurs have to take 
decisions based on very incomplete information. Therefore, framing opportunities for 
international markets demands high risk taking propensity, commitment and self-confidence. 
 
This was already mentioned in entrepreneurship research, where high levels of self-efficacy and 
optimism were found to be associated with opportunity recognition and implementation (Krueger 
and Dickson, 1994; Shane, 2003).  It may, therefore, be argued that born globals entrepreneurs 
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strongly believe in their capabilities to design firms operations with an international scope. 
Entrepreneurs with lower perception of self-efficacy hardly take the challenge to start their 
operations in unknown and risky international environments. 
 
Based on the above discussion we suggest that, 
P2: Born global entrepreneurs show high risk taking and  self-perception levels 
 
As it was mentioned above, knowledge and experience are key sources of opportunities. Research 
on born globals confirms this contention, showing that firms are often an extension of 
entrepreneurs’ previous activities. In the early stages of firms, entrepreneurs and resources may 
be difficult to disentangle, a substantial part of firms’ competitive advantages being rooted in 
entrepreneurs competences (Kummerle, 1999). As Hayek (1945) and Ronstadt (1988) pointed 
out, entrepreneurs have specific “knowledge corridors” which broadly define the scope of their 
objectives and initiatives. Further analysing this entrepreneurs/knowledge nexus, one may 
distinguish between two different perspectives of using knowledge as a basis for framing 
opportunities and launching a business venture: knowledge depth, and knowledge complexity. 
Knowledge depth corresponds to the level of knowledge mastering of a given scientific field, 
while knowledge complexity involves the combination of different disciplinary knowledge 
streams to build up higher level syntheses, eventually generating new concepts and solutions 
designed for business application.  
Extant literature suggests that born globals tend to be created by entrepreneurs with higher levels 
of knowledge depth. Such entrepreneurs often have post-graduate education, being examples of 
excellence in R&D (Beibst et al, 2003; Bell, 1995; Bloodgood et al, 1996; Burgell et al, 2001; 
Dominguinhos, 2002; Jones, 1999; Phiri et al, 2003; Sharma and Blomstermo, 2003) or 
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mastering specific knowledge about particular industries or activities (Andersson and Wictor, 
2003; Evangelista; 2003; McAuley, 1999; Sopas, 2001). This advanced and novel knowledge 
allows them to design innovative products and, in extreme cases, create new global markets. 
Therefore, they enjoy international competitive advantages, which may enable them to overcome 
the liabilities of foreignness and newness. As Autio (2005:15) suggests, “internationalisation may 
not always be an uphill struggle … it may also constitute a crucial condition underpinning the 
firm’s raison d’être”.  
 
The distinctive implications of knowledge complexity for opportunity framing were not, as far as 
we know, specifically tackled in the literature. Zahra et al (2000) remarked that technological 
learning is associated with the exposition to international environments, while Autio (2005) 
suggested that such exposition might encourage knowledge regeneration processes, leading to 
further competitive advantage. Both contributions are, however, concerned with later phases of 
born global activities – not with opportunity framing for company creation. Furthermore, they do 
not exactly address knowledge complexity as it was defined above. Yet, it is not difficult to 
understand how the innovative combination of disparate, ordinarily unrelated, knowledge streams 
may provide a capability to frame leading edge opportunities. Higher levels of knowledge 
complexity mastering may lead entrepreneurs to make sense of ‘new combinations’ as business 
opportunities. Such opportunities are usually perceived as geographically unbounded. They 
demand an international setting in order to create value. Sometimes there is no internal market for 
such products and services (Fontes and Coombs, 1997). In other cases solutions have the 
potential to attract global customer because they fill a gap in the market, or create an entirely new 
one.  
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Following this discussion, we propose the following: 
P3: Born globals entrepreneurs’ have higher levels of knowledge depth and knowledge 
complexity, gearing them to frame opportunities with an international scope, while domestic 
ventures entrepreneurs’ have lower specific competences or pursue knowledge applications 
which are not fully innovative in international terms 
 
Most research on born globals has recognised the relevance of personal relationships, and more 
specifically of business and academic international networks (Andersson and Wictor, 2003; Bell, 
1995; Coviello and Munro, 1995; Oviatt and McDougall, 1995; Sharma and Blomstermo, 2003; 
Wakkee, 2004). Such relationships allow entrepreneurs to gather more information for their 
judgments. The involvement in academic networks enables not just getting new insights from 
inter-action and problem solving, but also the submission of own ideas to judgement, the feed-
back from experts and the identification of suitable partners. Business networks may provide a 
better understanding of international markets, and the identification of ‘holes’ and neglected areas 
which may provide new business opportunities. Such relationships are also important for 
opportunity assessment, since they may be activated to validate ideas and to assess the possibility 
to mobilize additional resources and/or partners (Sharma and Blomstermo, 2003; Singh et al, 
2000; Wakkee, 2004). 
 
The exposure to international contexts allows people to develop international learning capabilities 
(Autio et al, 2000). Such capabilities facilitate the framing of opportunities for international 
markets and reduce the perceived risk, because international networks may be mobilized to 
evaluate opportunity feasibility and desirability, as well as to provide additional resources for 
project implementation. 
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In contrast, a person who studied and worked in a single country is more likely to concentrate 
their relationships there, framing opportunities in the context of domestic geographic boundaries. 
In this case, envisaging opportunities in international markets becomes more difficult, because 
information sources are limited, including finding   the right people to assess opportunities from 
an international perspective. 
 
In line with the previous arguments we propose that,  
P4: Born globals entrepreneurs have international social and/or business networks which lead 
them to frame opportunities with an international scope, while domestic ventures 
entrepreneurs’ networks are less dense and/or more focussed on the national territory. 
 
METHOD 
 
This paper is addressed to the identification of the factors discriminating business opportunity 
framing in new international and domestic ventures. It was shown above that this issue has been 
neglected by extant literature (Dimitratos and Jones, 2005; Zahra and George, 2002). Therefore, 
an exploratory approach seems to be the most appropriate. So far, we are not interested in 
defining a set of constructs to be submitted to a multivariate analysis. We want to undertake a 
first assessment of how entrepreneur-related drivers of opportunity framing may lead to born 
global firms or, conversely, to purely domestic ventures. 
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Case studies are an appropriate method for answering how? questions, and for studying recent 
and under-researched phenomena (Eisenhardt, 1989; Ghauri et al, 1995; Yin, 1994). Since 
opportunities are part of a process, the option for case studies, based on histories and experiences 
of entrepreneurs and on the evolution of their interaction with environment is warranted 
(Gummerson, 2000). Our approach also responds to Coviello and Jones (2004) quest for 
developing further case studies to interpret and understand social phenomena in the field of IE. 
 
Our purpose is to compare opportunity framing in born globals and domestic ventures. Thus, our 
procedure will be based on contrasting pairs of both types of firms, using a polar strategy 
(Eisenhardt, 1991). We are essentially interested in what can be learned (Tellis, 1997) from 
comparing polar situations, and in analytical generalization based on the propositions developed 
(Yin, 1994). Two pairs were selected. They were arranged with a view to provide a deeper 
knowledge about the subject under investigation. Two technology-intensive industries were 
selected (biotechnology, and information and communications technologies), having in mind 
their international orientation. Our purpose was to avoid the possible bias coming from 
considering industries with different global integration levels (McDougall et al, 2003). 
 
Born globals are defined as companies which have reached a share of foreign sales of at least 
25% within three years after their birth and, from inception, seek to derive significant competitive 
advantage from the use of resources and the sales of outputs in multiple countries (Andersson and 
Wictor, 2003). Domestic new ventures are firms that in the same time frame generate all their 
turnover in the domestic market. 
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Information was collected through semi-structured interviews undertaken with the members of 
entrepreneurial team. In fact, having in mind the focus of our analysis, key informants should be 
members of the initial entrepreneurial team with a significant role in the opportunity framing 
process. Interviews were also carried out with companies’ CEOs (in three cases, these were 
among the entrepreneurial team). The interviews lasted between 90 and 120 minutes, and were 
undertaken between February and June 2005; in three companies, there were two rounds of 
interviews. Broad questions about firm antecedents, start-up and development were asked to key 
informants. Closer attention was paid to idea generation and opportunity framing, as well as to 
new venture creation motives. More specifically, entrepreneurs’ previous experience, knowledge 
levels, and personal and business relationships were key issues for information collection. 
Additional elements about international activities were also collected, such as geographic range 
of activities, entry modes, strategy formation, and the time frame for entering international 
markets. Recognising that assessing attitudes such as risk-taking and self-efficacy becomes 
difficult and hard to measure (Zahra et al, 2005), and the application of psychometric scales to 
four cases does not seem to be appropriate, we attempted to overcome these by closely looking at 
entrepreneurial teams’ life, academic, and business trajectories, the challenges faced, and 
expressions used by entrepreneurs to describe their intentions and behaviours, related with those 
questions proposed by Markman et al (2002) and Jackson (1994). There was also recourse to 
secondary sources, mainly from websites, internal magazines and the press.  
CASES  
 
As indicated above, two pairs of contrasting cases were developed. Since we were not allowed to 
disclose the names of all firms, broad labels were used. The key descriptive elements of the cases 
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are presented below: first the two cases on information and communications technologies (ICT 1, 
and ICT 2), and then the cases on the biotechnology industry (BIOTECH 1, and BIOTECH 2). 
 
ICT 1 
This company combines marketing solutions and information technologies, being active in four 
areas: internet, multimedia, mobile communications and consultancy. Originally launched by the 
end of 2000, by two young students, with no previous managerial experience, but with some 
technical knowledge, the company was originally focussed on the design websites for local 
companies. One year later, the founders sold a majority stake to two newcomers: an Italian, with 
a MBA from Bocconi University, with experience as consultant in a well known international 
company, and a Portuguese with a degree in Economics and experience of implementing e-
commerce projects in a commercial bank. 
 
This operation led to strategic reorientation3, positioning the company as a marketing solutions 
provider: strategic consultancy services as multimedia and mobile marketing solutions were 
added to the original activity of website design. The new business model was mainly the result of 
the Italian partner’s prior knowledge and work experience, accumulated in ten years as 
international consultant. The business idea was fine-tuned by the contacts developed mainly with 
his former colleagues, specialists in the field, as well as by a process of formal search where 
market trends were incorporated. For instance, offering services connecting SMS and marketing 
was based on market trends identified in reports produced by a well known company in the field. 
So far, the company faces no competition in this niche in domestic market, and their main clients 
                                                            
3 Our analysis will be mainly focussed on opportunity framing in the context of this strategic reorientation. 
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are located in Portugal. The company was originally addressed to serve the Portuguese market, 
and this orientation was not changed by the strategic turnaround. 
 
ICT 2 
This firm develops georeferentiation multimedia information systems, and interactive 
entertainment software. Created in 2000, it had a turnover of around 5 million €, in 2004, from 
customers in Portugal, Spain, Holland, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, China, and Brazil. 
It has undertaken projects for large multinationals, such as Vodafone, Siemens, General Electric, 
Alcatel, and Nokia. 
 
The roots of ICT 2 are based on a University research group, which, in the period 1993-1998, 
worked on geographical information systems.  The knowledge in this field was also applied to 
virtual reality and environmental systems multimedia screening. Several of these projects were 
undertaken in cooperation with other European universities and led to papers published in 
scientific journals. In 1998, the present CEO of ICT 2 had the opportunity to work at MIT as 
visiting professor. During his stay there, it was possible to benchmark the research undertaken by 
his group in Portugal with that performed at MIT. This led him to a surprising conclusion: his 
group was carrying out pioneering projects at world level.  
 
One of the leading areas was the exploration of urban spaces through mobile tools, while another 
was the interaction with videos. In this field, another founder of ICT 2, during a scholarship at 
MIT MediaLab, realised that he had worked, in Portugal, for a same project (a video for the 
National Geographic), and that the Portuguese group had progressed further in the interaction 
between the audience and the movie.  
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The experience of these two members of the entrepreneurial team at MIT convinced them that 
their academic research might be translated into promising business opportunities. In 1999, when 
he came back from the United States, the present CEO of ICT 2 decided to invite four colleagues 
to launch this new firm. 
 
BIOTECH 1 
This company was founded in 2002 by two young graduates in Biology. After getting their 
degree, they worked for an 18-month period at a public laboratory, as research assistants. It 
became clear for both that employment opportunities in universities and research institutions 
were very limited, providing them almost no chances to follow a research career. Therefore, the 
idea to set up a firm to apply their technical knowledge gradually germinated, and by the end of 
their job in the laboratory, they decided to create their own firm. 
 
The idea was to exploit their knowledge in the fields of biology and biotechnology. Initially, they 
considered launching a lab to analyse water properties and bacteriologic characteristics, but a 
quick search in the internet revealed a strong competition and a need for high levels of 
investment. Then, the attention turned to birds, since they had already worked on the application 
of the Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) technique to birds. PCR enables, through ADN 
analysis, to identify the sex of each bird, a key issue for creators of exotic birds as well as for 
zoological parks. This was envisaged as a business opportunity. 
A search in the internet allowed them to make an estimation of the investment needed in 
machinery and equipment for applying the PCR technique, as well as to screen competing 
techniques for identifying bird’s sex. A former professor at the University of Évora was 
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contacted to help them to assess the idea. This conversation convinced them that that technique 
was really suited for the purposes envisaged, and that the feasibility of the project was high. 
Then, birds’ creators were contacted by e-mail to further evaluate the desirability of the idea. 
Soon, it became clear that there were no other firms applying this technique in Portugal, and that 
bird’s creators were very interested in having access to these type of services. The two 
entrepreneurs decided, then, to set up the firm, offering sex and disease tests as their main 
services, based on the PCR technique. 
  
Since inception, their main target was the domestic market. Such a focus was further enhanced 
when they discovered that there was a lack competition in the domestic market, while the 
services they intended to provide were already available in other countries at lower costs. Now, 
three years after launching the firm, 100 per cent of the turnover is still derived from the domestic 
market. The firm entered a new market segment, concerning disease tests in other animals, but 
the geographic market remains limited to Portugal. 
 
BIOTECH 2 
In 1996, after a getting a B.Sc. and a PhD. in biotechnology from Kings College (University of 
London), the founder of BIOTECH 2 returned to his home country and realised that that were 
almost no employment opportunities there. Biotechnology companies were few and small, and 
most pharmaceutical multinationals had no R&D activities in Portugal. The alternative, thus, was 
to return to England or to move elsewhere to profit from the knowledge acquired.  
The decision, however, was to launch his own company. His PhD research, in the area of 
biotechnology, had been undertaken in the context an international project involving several 
companies and other Universities and research organizations, including partners in the United 
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States and Denmark. During the scholarships there, the entrepreneur became more aware of the 
biotechnology market boom. In his conversations with partners from pharmaceuticals companies, 
he realised that a market for cheap copies of therapeutic proteins – called biogenerics – was about 
to be created, because the validity period of some key patents was about to expire. The perception 
of this opportunity led him to contact a former PhD colleague and to convince him to join the 
entrepreneurial team. This colleague’s knowledge in molecular biology was envisaged to be an 
asset for the new firm. At the end of the day, he joined the venture, to become Chief Scientific 
Officer (CSO) and responsible for intellectual property. 
 
BIOTECH2 main mission was defined as to provide generic pharmaceutical companies with the 
biotechnology know-how needed to produce specific new products in the area of recombinant 
human proteins. The firm positions itself in technology development business, licensing its 
know-how and/or patents to manufacturing and marketing partners (Bommer et al, 2002).  
 
Initially, a consultancy contract with a German company was established, mainly in the fields of 
intellectual property and market research. This contract allowed the entrepreneurial team to 
confirm that the idea was feasible. Simultaneously, there was a bet on the development of own 
technology. This was undertaken in close cooperation with leading international universities and 
laboratories, mainly through research projects aimed at developing new patents. The network 
behind the PhD project was used to mobilize people and/or organisations holding specific 
knowledge deemed to be relevant for the development of the company, as well as to forge 
contacts with potential partners. Simultaneously, there was a policy of attending international 
conferences to present research results and to strengthen personal networks. International 
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expansion was developed in close cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, getting access to 
new markets.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
In order to make an inter-case comparison easier (Yin, 1994), the main features of the pairs of 
cases studied are presented in Table 1. 
 
******** Table 1 about here ******** 
 
The first proposition suggested that, in born globals, opportunities are framed without reference 
to geographic boundaries, while domestic new ventures are, since inception, designed for the 
domestic market. In information and communications technologies, ICT1 perceived the 
opportunity as a ‘hole’ in domestic market, waiting to be exploited. A specific package of 
business services concerning the application of internet and mobile communication technologies 
to marketing was specifically designed to ‘fill’ that ‘hole’. The international experience of one 
member of the entrepreneurial team was used to gain advantage in the domestic market, not as a 
leverage to a broader definition of the opportunity in geographic terms. In contrast, the very 
framing of the opportunity in ICT 2 required a worldwide perspective to make its exploitation 
feasible.  
 
With regard to the biotechnology start-ups, BIOTECH 1 perceived the opportunity as strictly 
domestic. The absence of national competitors, together with entrepreneurial team’s limited 
scientific, managerial and financial resources, led to define clear geographic boundaries. 
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Conversely, the way how BIOTECH 2 opportunity was framed required the targeting of 
international customers (the generic pharmaceuticals firms). It made no sense to focus on a 
domestic, very limited market, where the main players are subsidiaries of multinational firms.  
 
Looking at ICT 2 and BIOTECH 2 together, there are striking similarities. Both were designed to 
operate internationally. The way how the opportunities were framed only made sense for global 
markets; for instance, providing know-how and technology for biogenerics producers and 
offering games for mobile phones or virtual effects for cinema requires a capacity to compete 
globally. In both cases, the world was the firm’s raison d´être (Autio, 2005). Not surprisingly, the 
CEO’s of both firms converged in stressing that “the world is our natural place”.  
 
Our findings indicate that being a born global or a domestic company is strongly related to the 
opportunity framing process (Chandler et al, 2002). Therefore, Proposition 1 is confirmed. 
 
The comparison of the ICT pair has not shown a clear difference in risk-taking levels. As far as 
one can judge, the risks entered by ICT 1 entrepreneurs were even higher then those faced by ICT 
2, since for the last the launching of the firm did not imply the abandonment of their University 
careers. In the case of the biotechnology firms, there was a common root behind the creation of 
firms: scarce employment opportunity prospects. Again, however, we were not able to find any 
difference with regard to risk-taking.  
 
Both entrepreneurial teams in ICT 1 and ICT 2 have shown high levels of self-perception. 
However, while for ICT 1 the benchmark was consultancy firms in Portugal, for ICT 2 the 
references were the leading researchers worldwide. The difference in self-perception is more 
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striking in the case of biotechnology firms. While the founders of BIOTECH 2 strongly believed 
in their capabilities to develop patentable knowledge, the entrepreneurs of BIOTECH 1 had a 
clear awareness of their knowledge and experience limitations.  
 
The comparative analysis of the two pairs suggests that there were no major differences with 
regard to risk-taking characteristics. Conversely, in each pair, born global entrepreneurs 
perceived themselves as more knowledgeable and close to world’s leading edge than their 
counterparts in new domestic ventures. It seems that Krueger and Dickson (1994) and Shane 
(2003) arguments about higher levels of entrepreneurs’ self perceptions are correct, but need 
further qualification: self-perception levels of international new ventures entrepreneurs tend to be 
higher than those exhibited by the founders of domestic new ventures. Born global entrepreneurs 
are very optimistic about their knowledge bases and their capabilities to overcome global 
business challenges. Thus, Proposition 2 got partial support, on what concerns entrepreneurs’ 
self-perception. 
It was argued in Proposition 3 that, compared to domestic new ventures, born global 
entrepreneurs had higher levels of knowledge depth and complexity, gearing them to frame 
opportunities with an international scope. The evidence provided by the two pairs fully supports 
that proposition. In the biotech pair, both the depth and the complexity of BIOTECH 1 founders’ 
knowledge were much lower than those of BIOTECH 2. While the entrepreneurial team of the 
last firm melded biotechnology, genetics, molecular biology and data mining to develop 
therapeutic solutions, the knowledge base of BIOTECH 1 was just anchored in the mastering of a 
not very complex nor difficult to learn technique, without relevant interdisciplinary connections. 
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Similarly, the comparison of the ICT cases confirms that ICT 2 founders have higher formal 
qualifications, and master more complex bodies of knowledge. In fact, while ICT 1 embraced the 
application of communication technologies to marketing, those were based on well-known 
international protocols. In contrast, the body of knowledge mastered by ICT 2 combined different 
streams of knowledge, namely geographic information systems, video and image processing and 
virtual reality, at the edge of scientific research. ICT 2 was even able to create new global market 
niches, regarding the development of mobile video games taking into account players location, as 
well as the application of virtual reality to entertainment. Simultaneously, both ICT 2 and 
BIOTECH 2 confirm Zahra et al (2002) and Autio (2005) suggestions that exposure to 
international environments encourages learning processes.  
 
In the ICT pair, both entrepreneurial teams had international social and professional networks, 
although in ICT 1 these were specific to one member of the team only. In this case, the network 
was mainly used to collect information and to assess feasibility, further stressing the risks of 
international competition and the advantages of focussing on the domestic market; therefore, the 
international network did not become a lever for internationalisation, but rather as a ‘filter’, 
strengthening the commitment to the domestic market. In ICT 2, the social and professional 
network, strengthened by the scholarship in the USA, was instrumental in motivating the 
entrepreneurial process, and in confirming the desirability of framing the opportunity as global.  
As one of the entrepreneurs remarked, “if professors at MIT become successful entrepreneurs 
why at home we can not do it, having the same scientific knowledge?” 
 
The contrast of social networks’ density and international width is very striking in the 
biotechnology pair. While in BIOTECH 1 the network was strictly Portuguese, in BIOTECH 2 
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the wide international nature of the network, encompassing academics and industry professionals 
from both sides of the Atlantic, was instrumental in encouraging the main founder to frame the 
opportunity with an international scope. Such a network was mobilized very early in the process, 
to attract a colleague with strong research skills. In both cases, personal networks were used 
(remember the recourse to a former professor in BIOTECH 1), but the differences in density and 
international scope were clearly translated in the way how the opportunities were framed. 
 
One may conclude, therefore, that international networks are crucial to understand the emergence 
of a firm as born global, although the very existence of an international network does not 
necessarily lead to an international opportunity framing, as ICT 1 has shown. For both ICT 2 and 
BIOTECH 2 international networks were central in the process of making sense of, and 
identifying, an international business opportunity. Consequently, Proposition 4 is broadly 
confirmed, although the case of ICT 1 suggests that entrepreneurs’ international networks per se 
do not imply that the opportunity would be framed as international, irrespectively of the 
characteristics of the underlying knowledge base. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The rationale behind this paper was the need for further research on the opportunity framing 
process to fully understand the differences between born globals and new domestic ventures. 
While McDougall (1989) and McDougall et. al. (2003) identified several key discriminating 
factors between these two types of firms, they did not relate them to the opportunity framing 
process. From our perspective, the study of such process is essential to grasp the very roots of the 
differences between new international and domestic ventures. Opportunity framing is central in 
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designing new firms business concept, product and geographic market scope, and competitive 
positioning. It should therefore be granted further attention to better understand the new breed of 
firms often called born globals. 
 
We argued that opportunity framing involves a conjecturing process, where the attitudes and 
motivations, the competences and the cognitive processes of the members of the entrepreneurial 
team play a key role. In the present paper we concentrated just on a few aspects, namely 
entrepreneurs’ risk-taking and self-perception characteristics, knowledge depth and complexity, 
and social networks. The research had an exploratory nature, since it was just aimed at taking a 
first inroad into the subject, and not at providing a quantitative testing of hypotheses. Two 
contrasting pairs of case studies were undertaken, to generate specific knowledge about the 
relationships between opportunity framing and firms’ competitive scope.  
This work confirms several perspectives common to born globals literature, namely on what 
concerns the relationships with knowledge intensive landscapes and the importance of social 
networks. Our findings on the role of entrepreneurs’ international experience as a discriminating 
factor are generally convergent with those of McDougall et. al. (2003). It seems, however, that 
such experience should not be taken in absolute terms, but rather be related to the depth and, 
especially, complexity of the knowledge held, as the comparison of the two cases in information 
and communication technologies illustrates. Similarly, the role of international social networks in 
encouraging born globals should not be considered in absolute terms: while, in general, they tend 
to lead to born globals, such influence seems to be contingent upon the complexity and 
specificity of the knowledge held. Our findings also suggest that self perception, rather than risk 
taking as such, may be an important factor in discriminating the way how opportunities are 
framed (and exploited) by born globals. 
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More than providing answers, the present paper was aimed at exploring an under-researched area 
on the study of born globals. The results clearly show the existence of promising issues that need 
further research. The analysis of opportunity framing processes is relevant, since it goes into the 
‘heart of the matter’ of entrepreneurial initiatives and suggests the existence of clear differences 
between born globals and domestic new ventures. Further case study research is needed, 
following the same path, in order to better identify possible discriminating factors. In this vein, 
another promising field is the improvement in the conceptualization of opportunity framing, to 
investigate other possible factors; for instance, we did not consider entrepreneurs’ innovative 
attitudes nor cognitive processes. Simultaneously, further work is needed on the 
operationalisation of some concepts, such as risk-taking, self-perception, or knowledge 
complexity. This will be essential to enable, at a later stage, the undertaking of quantitative 
research on opportunity framing factors discriminating between born globals and domestic new 
ventures. 
 
